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Abstract
Whereas evidence-based medicine (EBM) encourages the translation of medical research
into decision-making through clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), patient-centred care
(PCC) aims to integrate patient values through shared decision-making. In order to
successfully integrate EBM and PCC, I propose a method of orienting physician
decision-making to overcome the different obligations set out by a formally-rational
EBM and substantively-rational ethics of care. I engage with Weber’s concepts “the ethic
of responsibility” and verstehen as a new model of clinical reasoning that reformulates the
relationship between medical knowledge and social values, while demonstrating the
relevance of the classical sociological cannon to contemporary medical humanities.
Keywords MaxWeber . Verstehen . Shared decision-making . Patient-centred care . Evidence-
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Consider modern medicine, a practical technology which is highly developed scientif-
ically. The general “presupposition” of the medical enterprise is stated trivially in the
assertion that medical science has the task of maintaining life as such and of diminishing
suffering as such to the greatest possible degree. Yet this is problematical. . . . Whether
life is worthwhile living and when – this question is not asked by medicine. Natural
science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish to master life
technically. It leaves quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and do
wish to master life technically and whether it ultimately makes sense to do so. (Weber
[1919] 1946, 144)
Max Weber’s well-known comments about the separation between science and values are
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integrate evidence-based medicine (EBM) with patient-centred care (PCC). EBM is defined as
the conscientious and judicious use of medical research (“evidence”) in clinical practice
(Sackett et al. 2000, 1). Under EBM, the best evidence is considered to be the results of
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (Guyatt et al. 2008). RCTs measure the effectiveness of
therapies and medical intervention. The results are subjected to statistical modeling in order to
demonstrate the usefulness of a therapy so that a doctor can apply this knowledge in her/his/
their practice. EBM aims to master the practice of medicine through the use of evidence to
improve medical decision-making.
This paper aims to synthesize EBM with PCC through Max Weber’s political sociology,
which provides a method to integrate facts and values in decision-making. To make my
argument, first I introduce an exemplary case that highlights the conflict between medical
evidence/facts and patient values. Next, I define the nature of evidence in shared decision-
making as one way to integrate EBMwith PCC. I demonstrate that these views aim to improve
the sharing of medical facts yet fail to capture patient values. In order to provide a method that
integrates these two approaches, I explain the nature of the conflict by drawing on the
underlying forms of rationality that guides medicine’s attempts to systematize the uptake of
evidence (clinical practice guidelines) and values (codes of ethics). Both of these rationalities, I
argue, are too abstract and render decision-making a technical procedure that is guided by
general rules. Weber is helpful for resolving the dilemmas of rule-following and the fact/value
distinction because those who occupy leadership roles, such as doctors who are entrusted with
managing our health, can act in nontechnical ways. That is, if doctors are guided by a sense of
responsibility, or, as I argue, in the case of medicine, a shared responsibility, patient values can
be integrated into decision-making in ways that are guided by patient values. For PCC to be
successfully integrated with EBM, decision-making requires a method that is not formalized to
rules but is attentive to the messiness of the clinic and seeks to overcome the conflict through a
patient-oriented method of decision-making, which is not rule-guided.
Decision-making in medicine: the conflict between EBM and PCC
Making decisions is far from simple in the clinic. For example, in a Sunrise Rounds blog post
titled, “Against Medical Advice?” on August 3, 2012, Doctor James Salwitz, an oncologist,
writes about a recent difficult decision:
Stan is a 57-year-old man with curable colon cancer who requires surgery. Unfortunate-
ly, that surgery will result in a colostomy.1 Without that specific operation, there is an
increased risk the cancer will spread. Stan is smart, aggressive and independent. He
wants us to modify the treatment to avoid the colostomy. However, such a compromise
is outside standard of care, and not supported by what modern medicine understands
about colon cancer treatment.
In my office, Stan and I talk at length and he poses a challenging question. He says,
“Doc, if I was a friend of yours what would you recommend?” After a moment of
thought, I decide that is easy. I would give a recommendation that makes cure most
likely. Hundreds of thousands of patients live active lives with colostomies, but very few
live such lives with active colon cancer. Therefore, I would tell my friend to have the
surgery, accept the colonoscopy, giving the most compassionate support I could
muster.
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However, then I had a conversation inside my own head. I asked me, Jim Salwitz, not Dr
Salwitz, what I would do... To my surprise, I had a moment of bright light insight and
intuition. I might very well accept the risk of colon cancer recurrence, nary even death,
and not get the colostomy. I was stunned! Patient Jim overrides Dr Jim...
This anecdote points to the fact that despite the best evidence, the doctor is confronted with an
ethical dilemma about what to recommend to his patient about the operation. If Salwitz was
following EBM, he would make decisions based on the best possible outcome, which he
knows from medical research is the operation. But the quality of life and the patient’s values
come into conflict with this determination. The doctor is conflicted about what he ought to do.
Critics of EBM have said that the use of guidelines in medical practice raises questions
about ethics – what the doctor ought to do with the evidence, and how she/he/they ought to
interpret these general rules into their practices. For example, in an analysis essay published in
the British Journal of Medicine, the evidence-based Renaissance Group stated that EBM is
now a movement in crisis. EBM was defined as a movement that changed medicine
(Greenhalgh, Howick, and Maskery 2014). Now, however, medicine is no longer true to the
principles of EBM: there is an “overemphasis on algorithmic rules” (19). True evidence-based
practice, the authors state, is not bound by rules but relies on a strong relationship between
physicians and patients (20). The EBM model, however, has been criticized for its lack of
patient-centredness (e.g., Mead and Bower 2003, 1103).
Patient-centred care (PCC) is defined as “the need for clinicians, staff, and health care
systems to shift focus away from diseases and back to the patient and family” (Barry and
Edgman-Levitan 2012, 780). Various attempts have been made to synthesize the values of
medicine with the values of the patient and his/her/their family. Evidence-based patient-centred
care is defined as “the use of evidence-based information as a way of enhancing people’s
choices when those people are patients” (Elwyn and Edwards 2009, 7). The concern in the
PCC literature, however, is that evidence under EBM can be at odds with patient experience
and values because patient experience is difficult to quantify and is thus unreliable and
irrational under EBM (Cronje and Fullan 2003, 357-358). Under EBM, physicians are
expected to use their clinical expertise to integrate the best evidence, but critics have shown
that not only is there a tension between the evidence and evidence-based guidelines and
clinical expertise (e.g., Greenhalgh 1999, 323), but “the status of scientific data as evidence
rests not only in the research itself, but in the diverse communities of physicians who interpret
and use them” (Berkwits 1998, 1542). Further, the value of the facts derived from medicine
about the patients’ experience becomes meaningful within their communities and in relation to
cultural values. The integration of EBM with PCC requires a way to move from evidence to
practice, or facts to decision, that respects the social elements of the clinical encounter. PCC
emphasizes the patient’s autonomy and role within decision-making, yet under EBM, there is a
conflict between patient autonomy and the doctor’s need to make good judgments (Godophin
2009, e188).
The PCC approach aims to overcome these issues. Recently, PCC has found its way into
the EBM literature through the method of shared decision-making (SDM), where “both parties
share information: the clinician offers options and describes their risks and benefits, and the
patient expresses his or her preferences and values” (Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012, 781).
One of the challenges in clinical practice that SDM aims to overcome is the requirement to
give patients informed choice. Patients, however, come to the clinic with information that lies
beyond the evidence-base. For example, they may have done their own online research, or they
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may have obligations and values that guide their decisions. In the literature, SDM has been
primarily focused on the creation of decision-aids for physicians to share with their patients:
“Good shared decision making requires clinicians to have access to detailed knowledge and
ideally summaries of the latest evidence and the means to share it in a way that supports
thoughtful deliberation” (Agoritsas et al. 2015). These aids come in a variety of formats,
including a move towards electronic formats (e.g., Agoritsas et al. 2015). The aids aim to
provide patients with information to help them make decisions consistent with their values and
based on medical knowledge and perception of risk in order to reduce ambivalences and
increase patient involvement in their own care (Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012, 781).
Research in the social sciences can help improve SDM models (e.g., Statterfield et al.
2009). If PCC and EBM combine, there can be a conscientious and judicious search for
choices that “respond to patient’s ideas, concerns and expectations” (Godophin 2009, e187).
SDM allows each to learn from the other and facilitates shared responsibility in any decision
about how to proceed.
There remains debate, however, in the literature about how to implement SDM in practice.
In some cases shared decision-aids are recommended (e.g., Giguere et al. 2014). In other cases,
better forms of communication are suggested (e.g., de Haes 2006). Before the method of
delivery can be determined, however, the fundamental ethical dilemma needs some resolution:
how can we reconcile the conflict between patient values with medical facts and evidence? The
debates about SDM and its integration with EBM tend to focus on incorporating the patient’s
values as a factor or information within the physician’s evidence-based decision (e.g., Epstein
and Street 2011). There is little discussion that conceptualizes the social responsibilities of each
person within the clinical encounter and their normative roles within decision-making. My
analysis offers a way to move beyond the medical fact/patient values distinction within the
ethics of decision-making by drawing on the political sociology of Max Weber whose method
of reasoning, called verstehen, will provide two alternatives: a way of understanding the
conflict between patient values and medical evidence and a solution that reconceptualizes
the role of the physician in the clinical encounter.
In the following section, I will demonstrate the forms of rationality that underpin the ethical
conflict between patient values in PCC and EBM. Next, I will provide some examples from
the field of medicine that aim to improve medical decision-making, including clinical practice
guidelines and codes of ethics to demonstrate their forms of rationality. I explain how these
guidelines cannot resolve the conflict between facts and values in medicine. Then, I draw on
Weber’s political sociology to demonstrate how his method of verstehen can be used as lay
perspective to integrate PCC into EBM.
Rationalization and medicine: formal and substantive reasoning
EBM’s solution to integrating patient-values and EBM takes a formally-rational approach. As I
will explain in this section, this approach limits the ability of the physician to consider her/his/
their responsibility to the patient’s values in the clinical encounter. Rule-guided activity is
technical and cannot be concerned with the evaluation of consequences.
MaxWeber’s historical analysis of economic activity is helpful for understanding the nature
of evidence-based decision-making. Weber’s object of analysis concerned two types of rational
social action, which were both oriented to specific goals: Zweck- or instrumentally-rational
social action is oriented by the auspices of goals and calculated means of attaining them;
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whereas wert- or value-rational social action is oriented by a belief in a value for its own sake,
such as ethical or religious beliefs (Weber 1978, 24-25). Weber builds upon this distinction to
develop the rationality or mode of reasoning that guides socially organized activity. His work
on formal rationality can be used to understand the modern emergence of a particular way of
regulating and calculating medical decisions. For example, the goals of medicine are to
“maintain life” and “diminish suffering” (Weber [1919] 1946, 144). Formal rationality is
characterized by the “degree in which the provision of needs...is capable of being expressed
in numerical, calculable terms, and is so expressed” (Weber 1978, 85). Formal rationality aims
to secure the ends of socially organized activity through calculable, predictable strategies
which are “technically possible and which [are] actually applied” (ibid). Action that is formally
rational is expressed in calculable terms with technical interventions, which orient individual
actions to the same end.
One of the major contributions of EBM to medical practice is its emphasis on creating
clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), which translate the results of medical research into
accessible recommendations for clinical practice. CPGs are general guidelines created by
medical associations and task forces that evaluate all available medical evidence (i.e., studies
about clinical therapies and interventions) in order to produce recommendations for clinicians
in their individual practices. CPGs are created to change physician behaviours (Guyatt et al.
2008). EBM aims to eliminate uncertainties surrounding subjective decision-making: if all
physicians are following general guidelines about treatment based on the best available
research, conventional “expertise” and physician intuition can be replaced by “evidence-
based” guidelines (Guyatt et al. 1992; Guyatt et al. 2008).
CPGs are “calculated” inasmuch as they are both based upon RCTs and biostatistical
calculation and prescriptions and procedures that are created with the goal of producing the
best possible outcome of any medical decision, be it diagnosis or treatment. For Weber, formal
rationality exists when the following can be observed:
General rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be
learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise which the
officials possess. It involves jurisprudence, administrative or business management ...
[And] does not entitle the agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given
for each case, but only to regulate the matter abstractly. (Weber 1978, 958)
The physician is expected to utilize her/his/their special technical and clinical expertise to
execute the recommendations. CPGs are general rules that regulate physician activity
abstractly.
It is helpful to briefly discuss the hierarchy of evidence in EBM to further illustrate
the principles of formal rationality by which abstract rules and evidence are rendered
meaningful in a clinical situation. As noted above, “evidence” is articulated in the
assessment of medical research, specifically in randomized controlled trials (RCTs),
observational and comparative clinical studies, and mechanistic and expert reasoning.
In the theoretical hierarchy of evidence, “any empirical observation constitutes potential
evidence, whether systematically collected or not;” this includes both unsystematic
observations made by doctors and physiologic experiments (Guyatt et al. 2008, 10).
Systematic observations produced by RCTs are considered the best evidence or what
medicine refers to as the “gold standard” of evidence. Unsystematic clinical observations
that are made by individual clinicians are considered the weakest form of evidence and
the most susceptible to the uncertainties of individual sensibilities. Clinician expertise
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and experience remains an asset for making judgments and decisions in the clinical
setting, as mentioned above. Under EBM, physicians are taught to critically appraise the
evidence from the medical literature, to order the results they find in scientific studies
and determine their worth for the individual patient and her/his/their care.2 See Table 1
for an explanation of how EBM ranks the strength of evidence and clinical research upon
which judgments can be made.
Ideally, the physician follows the recommendations laid out in CPGs when treating
individual patients. Guidelines are created by ranking the evidence and are intended to
improve the effectiveness of the physician’s decision in clinical care. These goals are formal-
ized through a set of rules, CPGs that recommend treatment and intervention.
Generalization is another “form of highly abstract rules [which] are formulated and applied”
(Weber 1978, 657). In order for formal rationality to be effective, the rules must be regarded as
gapless. Other research has addressed the formal rationality of evidence-based medical
practice. For example, the work of Timmermans and Berg (2005) demonstrated that EBM
played a role in standardizing medical practice. CPGs, they argue, standardize medical practice
through generalization: “standards lead to watered-down competition, innovation, autonomy,
and creativity, concocting a world of increasing and empty sameness” (19). CPGs inhibit the
individual doctor from using alternate modes of reasoning and could shape the doctor-patient
relationship as a mechanistic encounter.
Other sociological analyses of the institution of medicine and individual practitioners have
found Weber’s work helpful for understanding various aspects of medical reasoning and
practice. Following Weber’s work, Hewa and Hetherington (1995) explained why a model
of mechanistic reasoning in medicine became predominant by emphasizing the calculability
and predictability provided by concrete evidence. Salwitz’s concerns about recommending the
operation to his patient is about the confidence he has in the outcome of his decision. He
quantifies it: “Hundreds of thousands of patients live active lives with colostomies,” he said,
which is a numerical expression of what the outcome of this course of action could be. The
doctor uses formal rationality when he recommends the operation to his patient. But, as noted
above, the doctor is torn between the values of the patient and evidence, which can be
understood by turning to a discussion of substantive rationality.
Formal rationality underlies general rules that are expressed on the basis of quantification,
whereas substantive rationality is organized by transcendental values. Weber characterized this






Both clinician and patient are blind to whether the patient is receiving the
therapy or placebo. The patient’s symptoms are measured and recorded.
Treatment ceases when the clinician decides that the treatment is not
effective.
Systematic Review Evaluation and assessment of results from many RCTs on the same therapies
or comparisons of more than one therapy for the same illness. The
methodological strength and confidence of the findings are evaluated.
Observational Studies The effects of treatment therapies (or no treatment, in some cases) are studied




Everyday empirical observations from clinicians in their practice.
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form of organization of social action to be substantively rational if actors were motivated by a
“criterion...of ultimate values” (Weber 1978, 85). Canadian Codes of Ethics provide an
example of substantive rationality in medicine. They are rules for social activity, but they
are articulated on the basis of value-rational aims. Ideally, medical action is oriented by a
transcendental belief that medicine is a social good. For example, the Canadian Medical
Association (CMA) (2004) has stated that physicians have many duties to their patients: these
include initiating and dissolving physician-patient relationships, communication, decision-
making and consent, privacy and confidentiality, research, as well as duties to society more
generally, to the profession, and to oneself. Under the category concerned with “decision-
making,” the CMA Code of Ethics states a physician ought to do the following:
Recommend only those diagnostic and therapeutic services that you consider to be
beneficial to your patient or to others. If a service is recommended for the benefit of
others, as for example in matters of public health, inform your patient of this fact and
proceed only with explicit informed consent or where required by law. (2)
Both individual and collective (social) values are central to the physician’s obligations. The
Code would recommend that a practitioner recognize and put into motion practices that are
committed to social needs (public health) and individual ones. When Salwitz considered what
he thought would be beneficial to his patient, he was confronted by the fact that what was
“beneficial” could be understood in two senses: one being the calculated outcome, whereas the
other about the patient’s values about their quality of life. A Code of Ethics requires a
physician to make decisions based on the personal values of the patient, but CPGs rely on
formal rationality. Here there is a tension between the two forms of rationality within medical
reasoning and practice.
To paraphrase Weber, Codes of Ethics can be conceptualized as an attempt to add a “value
rational” dimension to the practice of medicine, which is itself generally an “instrumentally
rational” type of action. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber analyzed
protestant writings in order to understand the relationship between formal and substantive
forms of reasoning. He examined how the ascetic lifestyles, and the subsequent obligation to
save money inherent in the protestant belief system, rationalized western economic activity. He
concluded that the “duty of the individual” to organize her/his/their life according to religious
principles (such as saving one’s money) was understood as a supreme good (2002, 16-17). For
Weber, values have a moral character insofar as they influence how individuals organize their
lives and practices (54). Protestant values, such as asceticism, were “a norm-bound style of life
that has crystallized in the guise of an ‘ethic’” (21). Protestants understood and believed in the
value of asceticism and organized their lives according to this principle.
The Weberian formulation of “ethics” is interesting sociologically because it allows the
Codes of Ethics to be understood as the crystallization of cultural values and beliefs as norm-
bound styles of life within a formally rational system of EBM. The ethical obligations laid out
in the codes aim to organize medical practice. Under the principles of EBM, practitioners have
a duty to make good, evidence-based judgments, and they have a duty to do more good than
harm. These duties are the “social ethic” of EBM and signify that the values of medicine have
a normative influence on the decisions of individual doctors. To paraphrase Weber, the Codes
of Ethics created after EBM imply “a notion of duty that individuals ought to experience, and
do, vis-à-vis the content of their…activity. This notion appears regardless of the particular
nature of the activity” (2002, 18). Values have a transcendental quality; they represent a
collective interest while also affecting the individual’s understanding. In EBM, the formal
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rationality of medicine has crystallized in the guidelines, whereas the ethical obligations for
medical practice are oriented by ultimately substantive rational criteria. Both forms of ratio-
nality, however, have taken on a rule-guided form. In order to integrate PCC with EBM, it is
important to provide a method that is not simply the technical application of rules to clinical
situations but a way to orient decision-making according to both formal and substantive
principles.
Medical ethics and political sociology
Weber’s sociological understanding of ethics emphasizes the physicians’ responsibility to
internalize transcendental social values in their practice. The Codes of Ethics fulfill a moral
mandate to diminish suffering and maintain life. Now, I turn to a discussion of politics,
specifically Weber’s two concepts “the ethic of principled conviction” and the “ethic of
responsibility” in order to resolve the disagreement between the formal and substantive forms
of rationality that underpin medical practice; doing so will allow me to theorize how these
principles can be put into practice at the individual level.
Weber defines politics in an extraordinarily broad definition: “embracing every kind of
independent leadership activity” (1994, 309). Medicine holds a leadership role over human
life by maintaining the health of society. For Weber, political action requires a version of
responsibility to which officials, that is, technicians of general rules, are not accountable. In
drawing this comparison between politicians and doctors, the tension between formal and
substantive rationality can be resolved by adhering to an ethic of responsibility which cannot
be bound by formal rationality.
Weber discussed the profession and ethics of politics by drawing a distinction between
politicians and officials. Although both roles may be associated with work that is generally
considered a part of “political office,” their duties encompass different relations to
responsibility:
[The politician’s] actions are subject to quite a different principle of responsibility, one
diametrically opposed to that of the official. When, despite the arguments advanced by
an official, his [sic] superior insists on the execution of an instruction which the official
regards as mistaken, the official’s honour consists in being able to carry out that
instruction, on the responsibility of the man issuing it, conscientiously and precisely in
the same way as if it corresponded to his own convictions. Without this supremely
ethical discipline and self-denial the whole apparatus would disintegrate. By contrast,
the honour of the political leader, that is, of the leading statesman, consists precisely in
taking exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, responsibility which he
cannot refuse or unload on to others. (1994, 330-331)
For an official, these duties are carried out by following the orders of his/her/their superior
officers. The emphasis is placed on following instruction rather than on the ends to which any
instruction is oriented. Weber might understand evidence-based CPGs as ideally relying on the
“discipline and self-denial” of the practitioner who follows the rules4. A political leader,
however, would have to take responsibility for the consequences that follow from any action,
including those of the subordinate officers. The leader must take personal responsibility for
what she/he/they decides, and this cannot be deferred to others. Doctors who act with this kind
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of ethic would understand that the consequences of their decisions are theirs personally, not the
creator of the guideline.
The question that arises here concerns the logic of this relationship. Weber does not assume
that good judgments are the result of good political leadership, while poor choices are the
result of rule-following. Leaders can make poor decisions, too, if they are bound by rule-
following: “But is it in fact true that any ethic in the world could establish substantially
identical commandments applicable to all relationships, whether erotic, business, family or
official, to one’s relations with one’s wife, greengrocer, son, competitor, with a friend or an
accused man?” (1994, 357). For EBM it is not simply a matter of stating that all good decisions
are those that maintain life and diminish suffering.5 Doing so would lend itself to creating a
body of rules (“commandments”) that ought to be followed and executed in every situation.
Codes of Ethics can be conceived as a body of rules that is applicable to all relationships, all
patients and their values. But the rules derived from any formally rational system cannot be
applicable to every situation, a sentiment which can be found in criticisms of CPGs as well as
Code of Ethics (e.g., Goldenberg 2010; Goldman 1980). Further, even proponents of EBM
understand that not all uncertainties can be predicted or mastered through rule-following:
“Clinicians must be ready to accept and live with uncertainty and to acknowledge that
management decisions are often made in the face of relative ignorance of their true impact”
(Guyatt et al. 1992, 2421). Although there are bodies of guidelines that aim to control for
uncertainty by establishing rules for “application to all relationships,” this statement made by
the authors of the original publication of EBM signals that the ethical consequences of
judgments matter in medical practice. Ethical orientations can resist rule following through
leadership, which goes beyond generalization and application and, instead, consider the
responsibility and consequences of one’s actions. This form of responsibility must be
accounted for given that the nature of any decision may be in ignorance of its forthcoming
consequences. A treatment recommendation, for example, may fail to diminish suffering
despite the doctor’s best efforts.
Weber turns to a discussion of consequences and the “ends” to which all action is oriented
in order to theorize the ethical responsibilities of political leaders. There are two kinds of ethics
for political leaders: the ethic of principled conviction and the ethic of responsibility. First, I
discuss the ethic of principled conviction, which is one that follows the adage, justification of
the means by the ends:
‘Consequences,’ however, are no concern of absolutist ethics. That is the crucial point.
We have understood that ethically-oriented activity can follow two fundamentally
different, irreconcilable maxims. It can follow the ‘ethic of principled conviction,’ or
the ‘ethic of responsibility.’ It is not that the ethic of conviction is identical with
irresponsibility nor that the ethic of responsibility means the absence of principled
conviction – there is of course no question of that. But there is a profound opposition
between acting by the maxim of the ethic of conviction (putting it in religious terms:
‘The Christian does what is right and places the outcome in God’s hands’), and acting by
the maxim of the ethic of responsibility, which means that one must answer for the
(foreseeable) consequences of one's actions. (1994, 359-360)
In the original text, Weber enters into a lengthy discussion of pacifism and political leadership.
The pacifist refuses to use violence because she is guided by the conviction that violence is
never necessary and is inherently wrong. The consequences that may fall from this decision,
however, are not the fault of the leader: The leader would always be right because she stuck to
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her principles. If the outcome was negative, it was “god’s will,” or “wasn’t meant to be,” and
so on. If the decision was successful, the pacifist would reaffirm her correct principles.
Pacifism is a form of substantive rationality: where decisions are made based on the criterion
of ultimate values and violence is always wrong. As Gane (1997) has argued, this form of
substantive rationality in politics, “precludes the rational consideration of the consequences of
action”; meaning that “conviction overrides all concern for the relation of the means and ends
of one’s actions, and that this unconditional commitment precludes personal responsibility for
the consequences” (551). To apply this to medical decision-making, an ethic of principled
conviction could be observed if the practitioner believed that following the evidence was
always the right thing to do, despite patient values, for example. The outcome of the decision
would be viewed as separate from the decision itself because the logic follows that all
decisions should adhere to the evidence. In other words, the conviction that the principle is
always correct supersedes any responsibility for the consequences.
The other form of ethics for political leaders is the ethic of responsibility that understands
that “one must answer for the consequences of one’s actions.” Weber described this kind of
ethical action as one of maturity, where a leader considers the possible consequences of their
action and takes responsibility for it. Weber quotes Martin Luther’s famous “here I stand I can
do no other” to demonstrate that the ethic of responsibility means that sometimes in life
individuals must “make sins”:
No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the achievement of ‘good’ ends is often
tied to the necessity of employing morally dangerous means, and that one must reckon
with the likelihood of evil side effects. Nor can any ethic determine how far the ethically
good end ‘sanctifies’ the ethically dangerous means and side-effects. The decisive means
of politics is the use of violence. It seems that the ethics of conviction is bound to
flounder hopelessly on this problem of how the end is to sanctify such a means. Indeed
the only position it can logically take is to reject any action that employs morally
dangerous means. (1994, 360)
Although Weber is here discussing political leadership, medicine’s mandate to maintain life
also deals with matters of both death and life. Rectifying the ends of any medical judgment
with the means creates a problematic tension between saving a life and diminishing suffering.
Some medical interventions require the patient to endure suffering with the aim of curing
cancer, such as Salwitz’s patient’s body being forever altered by the insertion of a colostomy
bag in order to increase the likelihood that his cancer would not return (to maintain his life for
the longest possible time). As another example, breast cancer treatment sometimes requires a
mastectomy, the removal of the breast, thus altering the body and sometimes causing mental
and physical suffering (e.g., Griffiths et al. 2010). The work of medicine requires an appre-
ciation of the consequences of any decision, and incorporating patient values in decision-
making still requires that physicians take responsibility for the outcomes of their recommen-
dations and judgments.
For Weber, these two ethics are incommensurable: “It is not possible to unite the ethic of
conviction with the ethic of responsibility, nor can one issue an ethical decree determining
which end shall sanctify which means, if any concession is to be made to this principle” (1994,
362). The ethic of responsibility requires a “slow, strong drilling through hard boards, with a
combination of passion and a sense of judgment” (369). For Weber, what makes the ethic of
responsibility distinct is its attention to the fact that decisions lack clarity in politics, leading to
uncertainty (Barbalet 2000, 339). In medicine, the ends of any medical judgment cannot be
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rectified with the means because the nature of any action is uncertain (the outcome cannot be
known in advance). The desire to save lives or diminish suffering may be the intention, but the
unpredictability (and sometimes irreversibility) of medical interventions are limits that cannot
be overcome by formally rational rules. Every medical intervention contains this paradox. I
will now reformate medical ethics in light of substantive rationality and the ethic of
responsibility.
Verstehen as the method of the ethic of responsibility
In this final section, I will provide an example of how physicians might employ this mode of
reasoning in SDM and integrate the principles of EBM with PCC. First I return to the Salwitz
example to elucidate further this relationship between doctor and patient and the ethic of
responsibility. After putting himself in the patient’s shoes, Salwitz realizes that he may not
want to follow the evidence and continues:
I told Stan about my personal “decision.” I told him that although the data was unclear, it
was likely he was taking a higher risk of cancer recurrence and death if he did not have
the colostomy. I emphasized that a full life was possible with a colostomy. However, I
told him that from a standpoint of risk verses perceived quality of life, I might personally
choose to avoid the surgery.
Salwitz admits that he changed his judgment from one based on evidence and the outcomes of
care (e.g., the likelihood of survival after surgery) to one of “personal decisions.” By shifting
from what he calls “Dr. Salwitz” to “Jim Salwitz,” as mentioned earlier, the doctor recognized
that decisions can be made on the basis of having a “full life.” Above, the experience of the
patient is related to quality of life after the surgery– whether it is worthwhile to live, rather than
an emphasis on the medical necessity to maintain life. Salwitz’s focus on quality of life harkens
back to Weber’s question about whether life is worthwhile living. Medicine (Dr. Salwitz)
cannot provide an answer to this question. His reformulation of what it at stake (the quality of
life) requires an ethic that deviates from the formal rationality of guidelines, evidence, and the
EBM programme. Taking the substantively rational principles of a Code of Ethics to heart also
requires making a decision that the physician believes to be beneficial to their patient. Filling in
the content of what constitutes as beneficial for the patient would require abandoning a view
that only regards the outcome that is most likely to be effective at maintaining life (e.g., based
on the evidence). An ethic of responsibility can reserve a place for an alternative way of
making medical judgments.
The method by which Salwitz arrived at his conclusions was through a “conversation inside
[his] own head.” Weber referred to this method as Verstehen, or sympathetic understanding:
“Empathic or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through sympathetic participation, we
can adequately grasp the emotional context in which the action took place” (1978, 5). The
insights Salwitz gained from such reflection were ethical in nature: the questions that the
patient must tackle were not only limited by the nature of any human action or decision, but
they were questions about the future and the kind of life the patient wanted to have. By
recognizing the limits of any medical action or intervention, the physician was able to consider
his own preferences as another perspective, a different way of understanding the same problem
and choice. This kind of reflection would be marginalized by the formal rationality of CPGs.
Verstehen is free from purely rational deicision-making because the ethical relationship
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between the practitioner and the patient’s understanding of her/his/their life is valued above all
else.
By engaging in this method of sympathetic understanding and reflection, Salwitz created a
new way of thinking about the patient’s values and the medical recommendations: he
described an occasion to rethink the medical recommendations about “what ought to be done”
based on the probable outcome of a particular procedure, and he treated it, instead, as a
question of the value of a patient’s life. The basis for this method of judgment was not the
epistemological commitments of EBM. It was not the probability of the outcome of colon
cancer that became the thing by which to formulate the solution. The decision did not become
“good” under an overriding conviction to a principle determined by outcomes and probabilities
or codes of ethics. Instead, the judgment was based on a commitment to “answering for the
consequences of one’s actions.” The impossibility of knowing the consequences in advance
required that the grounds for medical decisions were reformulated to include this kind of
responsibility. Salwitz stated that he would support whatever decision the patient made:
“Stan’s choice is not supported by research, data, my personal experience, nor by experts in
the field. Nonetheless, if he decides to choose that path [decline the operation], I will support
him” (Salwitz 2012). This decision was made in collaboration between what Salwitz recom-
mends, the information provided by the evidence, and the sympathetic understanding of the
patient’s values, his quality of life.
In this example, it is not the outcome of maintaining the patient’s life that provided the
overriding principle that organized the medical decision, as that would be a reassignment of the
same logic of principled conviction as EBM. Nor do I suggest that evidence, information, and
knowledge are irrelevant to any action. Even other critics of EBM have upheld the need for
good evidence: “The definition of evidence is important...because it illustrates the struggle
between patients, scientists, doctors, and public health administrators over the interpretation of
scientific results and how to decide the proper goals of medicine” (Saarni and Gylling 2004,
172). What I argue here is that the principles of a purely evidence-based practice limit the
possibility of this kind of ethic of responsibility as an alternative to EBM.
The ethic of principled conviction precludes the possibility of questioning whether the
principles to which the rules adhere are right or wrong. Medicine could benefit from a
relationship to alternatives such as one formulated here via Weber. Although the Codes of
Ethics require that physicians make value judgments, departing from the duties of medical
science and the assessment of evidence proposed by EBM, there are limited opportunities to
genuinely consider whether maintaining life is a worthwhile objective. It appears in the above
example that it was the challenge to Salwitz’s medical authority that incited him to take pause,
to exercise his reflection and sympathetic understanding. Further, I do not propose that this
ethic of responsibility can be strategically implemented through check-lists on the wards.
According to Weber, acting based on transcendental values requires an “intellectual sacrifice”
(1946, 155). Salwitz’s judgment cannot be adjudicated as “right” on the basis of evidence,
which abandons the formal scientific rationality of EBM. Alternative forms of reasoning,
however, can reinvigorate values at the centre of decision-making.
For Weber, the reaffirmation of values in public life requires “courage to clarify one’s own
ultimate standpoint” (ibid). Through the method of verstehen, the physician’s integrity to
patient care can be reconceptualized as the “creative pursuit” of healing in the face of human
suffering and illness. The lessons learned from Salwitz is that acting in the best interest of the
patient may go against the guidelines, evidence, and mandate of medicine to maintain life and
diminish suffering: the patient’s values may lead them to choices that result in their death, and
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the doctor would not be acting in the patient’s best interest, according to EBM and the Codes,
should she/he/they let that happen. PCC, however, requires that physicians learn to sympathize
with the patient and the values that guide their choices. A significant amount of the literature in
PCC and SDM aims to understand when and why patients want to offer input to the decision
about their own care (see, for example, Hajjaj et al. 2010 or Kvale and Bondevik 2008).
Verstehen resolves some of those concerns, as the physician can orient their decision-making
to the orientation of the patient (cf. Weber 1978, 3): they can empathize about their patient’s
motivations and understand their patient’s desires to be involved or not, and learn what the
patient values about the worth of their life. This form of shared decision-making is both one of
communication, which is a major concern of SDM (e.g., Clayman et al. 2012), but one that
requires the practitioner to take on the patient’s perspective to gain a personal and accurate
understanding of the patient’s desires and values.
Conclusion
Weber’s work on rationality exposes the tension between formal and substantive forms of
reasoning in modern western medicine. His political theory is helpful for resolving the
conflicts between the rule-guided action of EBM and leadership required for SDM. The ethical
orientation of the ethic of responsibility demonstrates the principle to which medical decision-
making can become truly patient-centred, while not being bound by any adherence or
conviction to a formally rational system, such as evidence-based CPGs. Weber’s method of
verstehen is relevant to medicine insofar as it resolves debates about the role of the patient and
their values in shared-decision making, and guides medical judgments by a patient-centred
understanding rather than merely communication.
More broadly, this paper demonstrates the contribution of Weber’s political sociology to
discussions about PCC, which relies on SDM.While there has been debate in the literature about
how to apply patient-centredness to EBM through SDM, no one has spelled out this method of
thinking for clinician. By using verstehen, physicians can better sympathize and take responsi-
bility for supporting patients’ decisions. It also allows for physicians to consider the values that
orient patients’ choices and interpretation of the evidence. While the evidence will be able to tell
patients and physicians how to maintain life through the most effective techniques and interven-
tions, the subjective understanding of when one’s life is worth living does not map easily onto
EBM’s terrain. Instead, because patient values are so individual, a different mode of reasoning can
be employed to try to understand what patients value. This brings me to the second point, that
EBM distracts attention away from thinking about the patients’ values because the evidence is
prioritized. SDM aims to resolve the imbalance between the evidence and the subjective value of
quality of life and how patients view their choices. Verstehen is attuned to both the values of
doctors and the objectives of medical practice. By acknowledging that the consequences of
medical decisions have to be lived with and may not maintain life or diminish suffering, and that
these decisions are made by both patients and doctors, dealing with the uncertainty of medical
practice can become a collective endeavour.
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Endnotes
1 According to the Gale Encyclopaedia of Medicine, a colostomy is “a surgical procedure that brings a portion of
the large intestine through the abdominal wall to carry feces out of the body.” It is a way to treat colorectal cancer.
2 The benefits and limitations of the critical appraisal method and the ranking of evidence has been discussed at
length in the medical humanities literature. For my purposes, I am focused on the ideal rational generalizability of
the evidence hierarchy, that it is helpful for physicians to calculate their decisions according to a formal set of
rules for ordering facts. For a discussion of the evidence hierarchy, see for example, Bluhm 2005.
3 Data adapted from Guyatt et al. 2008
4 For an explanation of this process, see Hanemaayer 2019.
5 I return to this point in the next section with a detailed example about how good judgments may, in fact, not
maintain life. For now, I will focus on explaining the distinction between the two ethics of political action.
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